Suspicious Powershell WMI Persistence (via ps_script)
This rule detects threat actors may establish persistence and elevate privileges by running hostile content triggered by a Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) event subscription.
SigmamediumWindowsv1
sigma
suspicious-powershell-wmi-persistence-via-ps-script
title: Suspicious Powershell WMI Persistence (via ps_script)
id: cab9284e-c07a-532c-936b-88fbcc5b6890
status: stable
description: This rule detects threat actors may establish persistence and elevate privileges by running hostile content triggered by a Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) event subscription.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/003/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1546.003/T1546.003.md
- https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/08cbd274bef78243d7a8ed6443b8364acd1fc48b/data/module_source/persistence/Persistence.psm1#L545
author: Huntrule Team
date: 2026-06-12
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1546.003
logsource:
product: windows
category: ps_script
definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled'
detection:
selection_ioc:
- ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
- 'New-CimInstance '
- '-Namespace root/subscription '
- '-ClassName __EventFilter '
- '-Property '
- ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
- 'New-CimInstance '
- '-Namespace root/subscription '
- '-ClassName CommandLineEventConsumer '
- '-Property '
condition: selection_ioc
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
Known false positives
- Unknown
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.