Suspicious Print Filter Pipeline Host Running Outside System32 via Process Creation

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-17
Updated
2026-09-17

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the print filter pipeline host binary printfilterpipelinesvc executing from any path other than System32 which reflects a WinSxS directory masquerade used by an in the wild Windows local privilege escalation exploit to run code under a trusted system process name. The legitimate binary only runs from System32 so execution elsewhere signals a masquerade.

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Suspicious Print Filter Pipeline Host Running Outside System32 via Process Creation
Pivot detection · T1036.005 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.