Suspicious PrivacyDrive.exe Execution from AppData Directory (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-26
Updated
2026-09-26

ATT&CK techniques

Execution
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects execution of PrivacyDrive.exe from a user AppData path, a payload staging location seen in Group-IB ClickFix intrusions delivering the LummaC2 stealer. Adversaries run binaries from AppData to evade path-based controls and stage stealer components, so this location and name combination warrants review.

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Suspicious PrivacyDrive.exe Execution from AppData Directory (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1204.004 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.