Suspicious Process Execution From Windows Tasks Directory

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → C2

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
- T1574.001DLL
Persistence
- T1574.001DLL
Priv Esc
- T1574.001DLL
Defense Evasion
- T1574.001DLL
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
- T1105Ingress Tool Transfer
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects process execution from the C\Windows\Tasks directory, an atypical location for legitimate executables. A malicious npm package delivering the AdaptixC2 agent staged its Windows payload in C\Windows\Tasks alongside a sideloaded msdtc.exe DLL. Because the Tasks folder is normally used only for legacy scheduled task metadata, running a binary from there strongly suggests payload staging and defense evasion.

Reporting behind it

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Suspicious Process Execution From Windows Tasks Directory

Pivot detection · T1574.001 · 9 related

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