Suspicious Proxy Execution via RegAsm or RegSvcs (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-12
Updated
2026-09-12

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects execution of RegAsm.exe or RegSvcs.exe outside of a developer build context, a signed binary proxy technique used by PikaBot to run injected code. The filter removes common Visual Studio and MSBuild parents that invoke these utilities during normal compilation.

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RegAsm.exe Process Execution Missing Command-Line and Assembly Path (Windows)
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Suspicious Proxy Execution via RegAsm or RegSvcs (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1218.009 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.