Suspicious Python Executing Staged Script From Temp Directory via DPRK Pyperclip Loader

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → C2

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
- T1059.006Python
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
- T1105Ingress Tool Transfer
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects a Python interpreter spawning a child process from a file written into the system temporary directory which mirrors the DPRK malicious Pyperclip module that decodes a base64 blob to a temp script and executes it via subprocess. Adversaries stage and run obfuscated Python payloads from temp to retrieve and execute second stage command and control code.

Reporting behind it

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Suspicious Python Executing Staged Script From Temp Directory via DPRK Pyperclip Loader

Pivot detection · T1105 · 9 related

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