Suspicious Reconnaissance Commands Spawned by Samsung MagicINFO Server

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-08-06
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Initial Access → Discovery
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Persistence

  4. Priv Esc

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Lateral Movement

  8. Collection

  9. C2

  10. Exfiltration

  11. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the Samsung MagicINFO application spawning cmd.exe to run reconnaissance commands such as whoami or arp, observed by Huntress following exploitation of the MagicINFO 9 server flaw. Attackers run host and network discovery immediately after gaining code execution through the vulnerable web application. Reconnaissance shells parented by the MagicINFO service indicate active post-exploitation.

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Suspicious Reconnaissance Commands Spawned by Samsung MagicINFO Server
Pivot detection · T1059.003 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.