Suspicious Remote Desktop Enablement via Registry fDenyTSConnections

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-26
Updated
2026-09-26

ATT&CK techniques

Lateral Movement
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the fDenyTSConnections registry value being set to zero from the command line which the Hancitor to Cuba operators use in rdp.bat to enable Remote Desktop for interactive access. Turning on RDP alongside firewall changes opens a hands-on-keyboard lateral movement channel. It matters because attacker driven RDP enablement precedes ransomware staging.

Related detections9 linkedT1021.001 — drag to rearrange
Malicious PsExec SYSTEM Interactive Shell Execution (via process_creation)
Suspicious Enabling of Remote Desktop via fDenyTSConnections Registry by DeadLock Ransomware
Suspicious Plink SSH Tunnel Execution (via process_creation)
Suspicious Remote Desktop Enabled via fDenyTSConnections Registry by Sandworm
Suspicious RDP Shadow Session Started - Native (via rdp)
Malicious RDP BlueeKeep Connection Closed - CVE-2019-0708 (via rdp)
Obfuscated RDP Tunneling Configuration Enabled for Port Forwarding (via process_creation)
Malicious RDP Shadow Session Configuration Enabled - Registry (via registry_event)
Malicious RDP Tunneling (via rdp)
Suspicious Remote Desktop Enablement via Registry fDenyTSConnections
Pivot detection · T1021.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.