Suspicious Rename of Text File to Script via Move Command

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-25
Updated
2026-09-25

ATT&CK techniques

Execution
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects a command shell renaming a .txt file into a .vbs script using the move command, a defense-evasion trick observed in a WizardSpider-themed chain where adb.txt was converted into adb.vbs prior to execution with cscript. It captures the staging step that disguises a script payload as a benign text file. Detecting this matters because legitimate workflows rarely rename plain text files into executable script extensions from the command line.

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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.