Suspicious Replaced Filesystem Helper Execution from Library Filesystems Bundle (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
macos
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-14
Updated
2026-10-14

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Cred Access

  6. Discovery

  7. Lateral Movement

  8. Collection

  9. C2

  10. Exfiltration

  11. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects execution of newfs or fsck filesystem helper binaries from a third-party /Library/Filesystems bundle when not launched by the expected disk-management daemons, matching the replaced-binary technique used in the CVE-2024-44243 System Integrity Protection bypass. Adversaries swap these SIP-heritable helpers to gain code execution with protected privileges, so surfacing anomalous invocation exposes tampering before a malicious kernel extension is loaded.

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Suspicious Replaced Filesystem Helper Execution from Library Filesystems Bundle (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1547.006 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.