Suspicious RisePro Stealer Password Dump File in Temp (via file_event)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
file_event
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-08-15
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Cred Access
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects creation of a passwords.txt file inside a Temp folder which the RisePro information stealer writes when dumping harvested browser credentials before exfiltration. The stealer occasionally fails to clean up this artifact and leaves it on disk.

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Suspicious RisePro Stealer Password Dump File in Temp (via file_event)
Pivot detection · T1555.003 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.