Suspicious RMM Installer Executed from AppData Roaming Installer Directory

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-29
Updated
2026-09-29

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects msiexec installing an MSI from a user AppData Roaming Installer directory, matching the rogue ScreenConnect payload masquerading as LogmeinClient.msi in a Qilin ransomware intrusion. Attackers deploy remote monitoring tools from user-writable paths to maintain covert access. Legitimate RMM installs originate from download or system directories, not roaming profiles.

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Suspicious RMM Installer Executed from AppData Roaming Installer Directory
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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.