Suspicious rnpkeys Execution from AppData for DLL Side-Loading (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-21
Updated
2026-09-21

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the legitimate RNP key utility rnpkeys.exe running from a user AppData Roaming path, where LummaC2 side-loads a malicious rnp.dll to gain execution. The signed binary is relocated into a fake application folder so its adjacent DLL is loaded instead of the genuine library. Execution of this developer tool from a user writable profile directory is highly abnormal.

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Suspicious rnpkeys Execution from AppData for DLL Side-Loading (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1574.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.