Suspicious S3 Access from Desktop File Transfer Clients by Bling Libra

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
aws
Service
cloudtrail
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-17
Updated
2026-10-17

ATT&CK techniques

Initial Access → Discovery
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Execution

  4. Cred Access

  5. Lateral Movement

  6. Collection

  7. C2

  8. Exfiltration

  9. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects AWS S3 API activity originating from desktop file transfer clients identified by S3 Browser and WinSCP user agents, tooling the Bling Libra group behind ShinyHunters used to enumerate and manipulate buckets with stolen credentials. Interactive client access to S3 is unusual for automated workloads and signals hands-on abuse. Detecting this exposes credentialed data access ahead of extortion.

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Suspicious S3 Access from Desktop File Transfer Clients by Bling Libra
Pivot detection · T1078.004 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.