Suspicious Safari-Masquerading LaunchAgent Loaded via launchctl on macOS

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
macos
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-09
Updated
2026-10-09

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Cred Access

  6. Discovery

  7. Lateral Movement

  8. Collection

  9. C2

  10. Exfiltration

  11. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects launchctl loading or unloading a LaunchAgent that masquerades as a Safari component such as com.applet.safari. The BlueNoroff GhostCall campaign installed persistence through fake Safari LaunchAgent plists and toggled them with launchctl. A LaunchAgent using an Apple-like label but not shipped by Apple indicates masqueraded persistence on macOS.

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Suspicious Persistence Load via Launchctl (via process_creation)
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Suspicious Safari-Masquerading LaunchAgent Loaded via launchctl on macOS
Pivot detection · T1543.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.