Suspicious Salesforce Data Access via Spoofed Automation User-Agents

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Category
proxy
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-13
Updated
2026-10-13

ATT&CK techniques

Initial Access → Exfiltration
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Execution

  4. Cred Access

  5. Discovery

  6. Lateral Movement

  7. Collection

  8. C2

  9. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects Salesforce API traffic carrying the distinctive spoofed user-agent strings Salesforce-Multi-Org-Fetcher/1.0 or python-requests used by UNC6395 after stealing Drift OAuth tokens. These clients drove SOQL enumeration and bulk extraction of User and Case records, indicating automated mass data theft rather than normal integration traffic.

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Suspicious Salesforce Data Access via Spoofed Automation User-Agents
Pivot detection · T1078.004 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.