Suspicious Script Execution from Public User Folder Staging Directory

ATT&CK techniques

Execution

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
- T1059.001PowerShell
- T1059.007JavaScript
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects wscript, cscript, or PowerShell executing a .js or .ps1 file staged under C:\Users\Public, a staging location used in a Huntress-analyzed malspam-to-loader chain to hide script components. The Public folder is world-writable and rarely a legitimate home for scripts. Interpreter execution of scripts from this path is a strong indicator of loader staging activity.

Reporting behind it

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Suspicious Script Execution from Public User Folder Staging Directory

Pivot detection · T1059.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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