Suspicious Script Execution from Public User Folder Staging Directory

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-07-09
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Execution
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects wscript, cscript, or PowerShell executing a .js or .ps1 file staged under C:\Users\Public, a staging location used in a Huntress-analyzed malspam-to-loader chain to hide script components. The Public folder is world-writable and rarely a legitimate home for scripts. Interpreter execution of scripts from this path is a strong indicator of loader staging activity.

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Suspicious Script Execution from Public User Folder Staging Directory
Pivot detection · T1059.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.