Suspicious Script Host Spawning LOLBins Used by XWorm Loader (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-11-11
Updated
2026-11-11

ATT&CK techniques

Execution
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the Windows Script Host wscript.exe or cscript.exe spawning execution proxies such as rundll32, regsvr32, mshta, certutil, msbuild, or powershell, the delivery chain XWorm uses to launch its next stage from a dropped script. Adversaries leverage script hosts to proxy execution through trusted binaries, so this behavior warrants review alongside the parent script location.

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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.