Suspicious Secret Scanning with trufflehog Verified Results

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-18
Updated
2026-09-18

ATT&CK techniques

Initial Access → Cred Access
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Execution

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects trufflehog being executed to scan the local filesystem for verified secrets and emit JSON output, the credential-harvesting behavior of the Shai-Hulud npm supply-chain worm. The worm runs trufflehog on compromised developer machines to collect cloud and registry tokens for further spread.

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Suspicious Secret Scanning with trufflehog Verified Results
Pivot detection · T1195.002 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.