Suspicious Self-Hosted GitHub Actions Runner Started As Root via Shell (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
linux
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-28
Updated
2026-10-28

ATT&CK techniques

Initial Access → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects a self-hosted GitHub Actions runner being started with the runner allow run as root flag on Linux hosts. Threat actors register self-hosted runners and force them to run as root to obtain a persistent backdoor with full privileges on the host. A runner explicitly permitted to run as root is highly unusual and warrants review.

Related detections9 linkedT1078 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious GitHub Actions Runner In Hidden Directory via Shell (via process_creation)
Suspicious GitHub Self-Hosted Runner Registration via Audit Log (via github)
Malicious Fire Ant Hypervisor Backdoor Artifacts on ESXi and vCenter (via file_event)
Suspicious Login Shell Assigned to Service Account games on Linux
Suspicious SSH Daemon Configuration Change Enabling Root Login
Suspicious NTLM Network Logon From Attacker Controlled Workstation Names (via security)
Suspicious dMSA Object Access with Migration AccessMask
Malicious ESX Admins Group Added to Privileged Directory Group
Malicious ESX Admins Group Creation via WinRM Host
Suspicious Self-Hosted GitHub Actions Runner Started As Root via Shell (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1078 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.