Suspicious Service binPath Hijack Followed by System Reboot

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
- T1543.003Windows Service
Priv Esc
- T1543.003Windows Service
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the sc command rewriting a service binPath in the same command line that triggers shutdown /r, matching the Sinobi tactic of hijacking a security service to run a dropped binary after reboot. The actors repointed the cbdefense service to a ProgramData executable and immediately forced a restart to load it. Combining a service binary reconfiguration with a reboot is a strong indicator of persistence and defense evasion.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1685 — drag to rearrange

Malicious Known Vulnerable Driver Load for BYOVD Attack

Malicious Bring-Your-Own-Vulnerable-Driver Load for EDR Killing

Suspicious Qilin EDR Killer BYOVD Service Installation via sc

Malicious Windows Defender Root Exclusion via Add-MpPreference (via process_creation)

Suspicious Modification of Windows Hosts File

Malicious TELEPUZ Service Persistence via CipherAllocator Registry Key

Suspicious Service Registration via Svchost netsvcs Registry Modification

Malicious AMSI and ETW Bypass via In-Memory Patching (via ps_script)

Suspicious PowerShell AMSI or ETW Tampering

Suspicious Service binPath Hijack Followed by System Reboot

Pivot detection · T1685 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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