Suspicious Service Persistence WinSystemHost via Process Creation

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
- T1543.003Windows Service
Priv Esc
- T1543.003Windows Service
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects creation of a Windows service named WinSystemHost via sc.exe. Threat actors attacking industrial organizations register this service to persist a malicious loader across reboots, masquerading as a benign system host process.

Reporting behind it

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Suspicious Service Persistence WinSystemHost via Process Creation

Pivot detection · T1543.003 · 9 related

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