Suspicious Service Principal Name Discovery via setspn Query

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-30
Updated
2026-09-30

ATT&CK techniques

Discovery
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects setspn being used with the query flag to enumerate service principal names, a Kerberoasting preparation step observed during Velociraptor misuse where the actor queried service accounts such as backup SPNs. Enumerating SPNs identifies service accounts whose tickets can be extracted and cracked offline. Command line SPN queries are uncommon outside administrative auditing.

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Suspicious Delegation Discovery LDAP Search Filter via Bitwise OID
Malicious Active Directory Enumeration via SharpHound or BloodHound (via process_creation)
Suspicious Group Discovery - Command (via process_creation)
SharpHound Host Enumeration Over Kerberos (via security)
Suspicious Active Directory Enumeration via ADWS PowerShell Cmdlets via ps_script
Suspicious Service Principal Name Discovery via setspn Query
Pivot detection · T1069.002 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.