Suspicious Service Registration Loading Vulnerable Driver

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
- T1543.003Windows Service
Priv Esc
- T1068Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
- T1543.003Windows Service
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects registry service registration where the ImagePath points to a known vulnerable kernel driver filename which adversaries create to load an exploitable driver into the kernel during bring your own vulnerable driver attacks. Creation of a service that maps to these driver binaries indicates staging of a kernel level defense evasion or privilege escalation capability.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1068 — drag to rearrange

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Malicious Payload Download From copy.fail Exploit Host on Linux (via process_creation)

Suspicious su Execution From Uncommon Parent Process on Linux (via process_creation)

Malicious Service Persistence via sc.exe Creating msdnetsvc

Suspicious Stately Taurus Masqueraded Service and Task Persistence via process_creation

Suspicious Service Registration Loading Vulnerable Driver

Pivot detection · T1068 · 9 related

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