Suspicious Shadow Copy Deletion via WMIC or PowerShell (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-03
Updated
2026-10-03

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Impact
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

What it detects

This rule detects deletion of Volume Shadow Copies via wmic or PowerShell referencing the shadowcopy class with a delete operation. VanHelsing removes shadow copies before encryption to inhibit recovery, so this command pattern flags pre-ransomware impact activity.

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Pivot detection · T1047 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.