huntrule

Suspicious SharpHound Active Directory Collection

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-30
Updated
2026-10-30
AnalysisDetection

ATT&CK techniques

Discovery

  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects execution of SharpHound collecting Active Directory relationship data through its all collection methods option which the BlackSuit actor used to plan privilege escalation and lateral paths and this matters because SharpHound and BloodHound ingestion collection is offensive reconnaissance tooling whose broad collection sweeps precede targeted domain compromise.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1087.002 — drag to rearrange
Malicious AdFind Domain Trust Enumeration via Trustdmp
Suspicious AdFind Person Object Enumeration via LDAP Filter
Suspicious Active Directory Reconnaissance via In-Memory Offensive PowerShell (via ps_script)
Suspicious Active Directory Export via Csvde via Process Creation (via process_creation)
Suspicious AdFind Domain User Reconnaissance Output
Suspicious Active Directory Reconnaissance Output via ADRecon CSV (via file_event)
Suspicious Domain Computer Enumeration via Net Group Command
Suspicious Active Directory Enumeration via AdsiSearcher
Suspicious ADFind Active Directory Reconnaissance Execution
Suspicious SharpHound Active Directory Collection
Pivot detection · T1087.002 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.