Suspicious SOCKS Proxy Persistence via SystemBC PowerShell Run Key

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-29
Updated
2026-10-29

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. Exfiltration

  11. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects a Run key persistence entry being written that points to a PowerShell SOCKS proxy script as used by the SystemBC component in the Gootloader intrusion to maintain a proxied channel and this matters because autorun entries launching PowerShell proxy scripts from staging folders are strong indicators of malware backed persistence and covert C2 tunneling.

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Pivot detection · T1547.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.