Suspicious SonicWall Access With Anomalous Chrome Linux User Agent via Webserver

PremiumReviewedSigma · Low · v1
Category
webserver
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-25
Updated
2026-09-25

ATT&CK techniques

Recon → Initial Access
  1. Resource Dev

  2. Execution

  3. Persistence

  4. Priv Esc

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects requests to SonicWall SSL-VPN and login endpoints that carry an automated-tool signature combining a Chrome 119 on Linux user agent with the campaign target paths. The reconnaissance campaign against SonicWall firewalls presents this consistent Chrome Linux user agent while probing management endpoints from commercial proxy infrastructure. Correlating the anomalous user agent with SonicWall endpoints surfaces scripted scanning that generic path-only detection may miss.

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Suspicious SonicWall Access With Anomalous Chrome Linux User Agent via Webserver
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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.