Suspicious SonicWall NetExtender VPN Command-Line Authentication with Always-Trust (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-30
Updated
2026-10-30

ATT&CK techniques

Initial Access → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Execution

  4. Defense Evasion

  5. Cred Access

  6. Discovery

  7. Lateral Movement

  8. Collection

  9. C2

  10. Exfiltration

  11. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the SonicWall NetExtender client being driven from the command line with inline username and password and the always-trust flag, the initial-access behavior in the Fog intrusion where stolen VPN credentials were replayed to enter the environment. Adversaries script NetExtender to authenticate with harvested credentials while suppressing certificate prompts, so a scripted VPN login on an endpoint is worth investigating against expected usage.

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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.