Suspicious SSH Key Push to EC2 via EC2 Instance Connect

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
aws
Service
cloudtrail
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-17
Updated
2026-10-17

ATT&CK techniques

Initial Access → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Cred Access

  4. Discovery

  5. Lateral Movement

  6. Collection

  7. C2

  8. Exfiltration

  9. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects use of EC2 Instance Connect SendSSHPublicKey and SendSerialConsoleSSHPublicKey to inject a temporary public key onto an instance, an access path abused by adversaries holding valid AWS credentials to reach virtual machines. Pushing keys through the control plane grants interactive access while bypassing key management controls. Detecting these calls exposes credentialed lateral movement into compute workloads.

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Suspicious SSH Key Push to EC2 via EC2 Instance Connect
Pivot detection · T1078.004 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.