Suspicious sslconf Execution From AppData EdgeUpdate Directory

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion → C2

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
- T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
- T1071.001Web Protocols
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects a process named sslconf.exe running from a user AppData EdgeUpdate\Install path, matching the SectopRAT payload staged by the FakeAgent Claude Desktop malvertising campaign. The binary masquerades under an EdgeUpdate directory name in a user-writable location that legitimate Edge updater components never use. Execution from this wrong context indicates malware persistence and RAT activity.

Reporting behind it

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Suspicious sslconf Execution From AppData EdgeUpdate Directory

Pivot detection · T1071.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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