Suspicious StrelaStealer DLL Execution via Rundll32 Hello Export from Temp (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-19
Updated
2026-10-19

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects rundll32.exe invoking the hello export of a DLL located in an AppData or temp directory, the loader behavior StrelaStealer uses to run its stealer payload dropped by a JScript file. The combination of a proxy execution binary, a user writable path, and the campaign specific export name reflects the StrelaStealer execution stage rather than normal library invocation.

Related detections9 linkedT1218.011 — drag to rearrange
Malicious Scheduled rundll32 Execution of ProgramData VMware DLL by BianLian
Malicious Mispadu Payload Execution from WebDAV Share via Rundll32 (via process_creation)
Malicious rundll32 Execution of Lazarus JavaPackage DLL (via process_creation)
Malicious Cobalt Strike Loader via rundll32 From ProgramData (via process_creation)
Malicious rundll32 IternalJob Export Spawned by wscript (via process_creation)
Suspicious Rundll32 Copied to Startup Folder via Blister Loader
Suspicious Rundll32 Persistence via Registry Run Key (via registry_set)
Malicious Rundll32 Execution of Image File Export via PLUSDROP
Suspicious Rundll32 Loading Non-DLL Image Extension File
Suspicious StrelaStealer DLL Execution via Rundll32 Hello Export from Temp (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1218.011 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.