Suspicious Systemd Service Unit Creation In System Directory

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
- T1543.002Systemd Service
Priv Esc
- T1543.002Systemd Service
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects creation or modification of a systemd service unit file under the system unit directories which is a common Linux persistence mechanism where an ExecStart directive is pointed at a reverse shell or malicious payload. Adversaries install rogue systemd units so their code runs automatically at boot with elevated privileges.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1543.002 — drag to rearrange

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APT28 httd Implant Persistence via systemd linux.service from Boot Directory (via process_creation)

Malicious Keyhunter Worker Systemd Unit File Creation

Masquerading Execution of Binary from Var Log Directory (via process_creation)

Suspicious Systemd Service Unit Creation In System Directory

Pivot detection · T1543.002 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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