Suspicious systemd User Service Persistence miasma-monitor (via file_event)

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
- T1543.002Systemd Service
Priv Esc
- T1543.002Systemd Service
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects creation of a miasma-monitor systemd user service unit used by the M-Red-Team AsyncAPI compromise for persistence. Writing a user-level systemd service lets an attacker relaunch a monitoring implant on login without root. The specific unit name combined with the user systemd path is a strong persistence signal.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1543.002 — drag to rearrange

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Suspicious systemd User Service Persistence miasma-monitor (via file_event)

Pivot detection · T1543.002 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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