Suspicious Telegram Bot API C2 Beaconing (via network)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Category
proxy
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-05-04
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects outbound HTTP requests to the Telegram bot API using sendPhoto and sendDocument methods which the CoralRaider actor abuses for command and control and exfiltration of stolen social media data. Abusing a legitimate messaging platform lets attackers hide C2 inside allowed web traffic and defeat domain reputation controls.

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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.