Suspicious Text-File Payload Staging in Temp (via file_event)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
file_event
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-06-20
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects creation of specifically named text staging files used to hold base64-encoded .NET loaders and encrypted configuration. The SHADOW#REACTOR campaign used a text-only staging pipeline before in-memory Remcos RAT deployment.

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Suspicious Fake GIF Magic Header Written to Disguise Payload File (via process_creation)
Suspicious Base64 Decode Piped to Python Interpreter for In-Memory Execution (via process_creation)
Suspicious Thumbs.ini File Written to AppData by UNC2970 MISTPEN (via file_event)
Suspicious Text-File Payload Staging in Temp (via file_event)
Pivot detection · T1027 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.