Suspicious TightVNC Server Installation as a Service

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-06-15
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. Exfiltration

  11. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the TightVNC server tvnserver.exe installed with the -service argument, an unattended remote access mechanism observed in a Huntress-tracked Tiflux campaign that deployed stealth VNC tooling for persistent control. Registering the VNC server as a service enables silent boot-time remote access. Service installation of hidden VNC tooling on endpoints is characteristic of attacker remote access rather than sanctioned support software.

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Suspicious TightVNC Server Installation as a Service
Pivot detection · T1543.003 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.