Suspicious Token Request Using Microsoft Authentication Broker Client to Obtain Primary Refresh Token (via azure)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
azure
Service
signinlogs
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-13
Updated
2026-10-13

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Cred Access
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Discovery

  7. Lateral Movement

  8. Collection

  9. C2

  10. Exfiltration

  11. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects token requests made through the Microsoft Authentication Broker client toward the Device Registration Service, the sequence Storm-2372 uses after harvesting device-code tokens to register an actor-controlled device and obtain a Primary Refresh Token. Adversaries leverage the broker client and a rogue device registration to gain durable access to a victim tenant, making this pairing a high-value detection for post-phishing persistence.

Related detections9 linkedT1528 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious Azure Tenant Root Elevation via elevateAccess
Suspicious Salesforce Connected App OAuth Authorization from VPN Egress
Suspicious M365 Device Code Authentication Flow via m365
Possible Illicit Consent Grant to OAuth Application via Azure AD
Suspicious Device Code Authentication via Microsoft Authentication Broker
Suspicious OAuth Device Code Sign-In to Authentication Broker via Tycoon 2FA
Suspicious OAuth Sign-In Using Visual Studio Code Client and Auth Broker
Suspicious AWS Virtual MFA Device Creation
Suspicious OAuth Application Consent in Microsoft Entra
Suspicious Token Request Using Microsoft Authentication Broker Client to Obtain Primary Refresh Token (via azure)
Pivot detection · T1528 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.