Suspicious Tusk Loader Execution from AppData AD_Security Directory

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-07
Updated
2026-10-07

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects process execution from the AppData Roaming AD_Security directory used by the Tusk infostealer campaign to stage its HijackLoader components and configuration. Executables running from this attacker-created path indicate active infostealer deployment.

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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.