Suspicious VMware Guest Operation Output Staging in vmware-system Temp Directory (via file_event)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
file_event
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-28
Updated
2026-10-28

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Lateral Movement
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects files being written under the Windows Temp vmware-system directory used by PowerCLI Invoke-VMScript guest operations. Fire Ant leveraged unauthenticated PowerCLI guest command execution from compromised vCenter and ESXi infrastructure, redirecting command output into this staging path inside targeted virtual machines. Legitimate administrative use of Invoke-VMScript can also generate these artifacts.

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Suspicious VMware Guest Operation Output Staging in vmware-system Temp Directory (via file_event)
Pivot detection · T1059 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.