Suspicious Whoami Discovery Spawned by Windows Script Host via Process Creation (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-23
Updated
2026-10-23

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Discovery
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects whoami /all discovery executed under a Windows script host parent, the reconnaissance SocGholish performs immediately after its malicious JavaScript runs as emulated by Red Canary. Script hosts collecting user and privilege context are a hallmark of the SocGholish fake-update loader beginning hands-off enumeration of a new victim.

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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.