huntrule

Suspicious Whoami Execution With Output Redirected to a File (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-05
Updated
2026-09-05
AnalysisDetection

ATT&CK techniques

Discovery

  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects whoami being run with its output redirected into a file, a reconnaissance-and-staging behavior used by loaders such as SocGholish to capture the current user and privilege context for the operator to review. Automated whoami-to-file collection is documented in the Red Canary Threat Detection Report as an early post-compromise step. Because interactive users rarely redirect whoami output to disk, this is a useful indicator of scripted hands-on activity.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1033 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious Whoami Discovery Spawned by Windows Script Host via Process Creation (via process_creation)
Suspicious Localized Administrator Account and Group Enumeration After Citrix Bleed Exploitation
Malicious Recon Output Staged in Qlik Sense Fonts Directory by Cactus Ransomware
Suspicious Host Reconnaissance Command Chain via cmd
Malicious Child Process Spawned From n8n Node Process
Suspicious Credential Enumeration via cmdkey List
Suspicious IIS Worker Process Spawning Whoami Reconnaissance
Possible Logged-On Session Discovery via Quser or Qwinsta (via process_creation)
Suspicious Reconnaissance Spawned by Injected SearchProtocolHost via process_creation
Suspicious Whoami Execution With Output Redirected to a File (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1033 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.