huntrule

Suspicious Windows Event Log Clearing via wevtutil on EC2 Host

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-07-30
Updated
2026-08-28
AnalysisDetection

ATT&CK techniques

  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the wevtutil utility being used to clear Windows event logs which destroys host forensic evidence. In the Wiz hybrid cloud response the attacker deleted local operating system logs on compromised EC2 Windows instances to frustrate investigation. This is important because clearing event logs is a deliberate anti-forensic action that almost never occurs during normal administration and hides earlier attacker activity.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1685.005 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious Windows Event Log Clearing via wevtutil (via process_creation)
Malicious USN Change Journal Deletion via Fsutil for Anti-Forensics
Suspicious Windows Event Log Clearing via wevtutil
Suspicious Windows Event Log Cleared via wevtutil during Ransomware Staging (via process_creation)
Suspicious Deletion of Terminal Server Client History via reg by UNC1549
Suspicious Windows Event Log Clearing via process_creation
Malicious Windows Event Log Clearing via wevtutil
Suspicious Event Log Clearing via Renamed Log Utility
Suspicious Event Log Clearing via PowerShell Invoke-Expression
Suspicious Windows Event Log Clearing via wevtutil on EC2 Host
Pivot detection · T1685.005 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.