Suspicious Windows Event Log Clearing via wevtutil (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-05-11
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects wevtutil being used to clear Windows event logs. This behavior was observed in Cyber Partisans activity aimed at espionage and disruption to destroy forensic evidence after intrusion. Because administrators occasionally clear logs during maintenance, matches should be correlated with the surrounding activity and account context.

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Malicious Event Log Clear Attempt - Command (via process_creation)
Malicious Event Log Cleared Using Diagnostics - Via PowerShell (via powershell)
Malicious Clearing of Windows Event Logs (via process_creation)
Suspicious Event Log Clearing via wevtutil During Ransomware Activity
Suspicious Event Log Clearing via Get-WinEvent ClearLog (Qilin)
Suspicious Windows Event Log Clearing via wevtutil on EC2 Host
Suspicious Browser History Wipe via RunDll32 ClearMyTracksByProcess
Suspicious Windows Event Log Clearing via wevtutil (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1685.005 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.