Suspicious WindowsCodecs DLL Sideload from Non System Path by Fighting Ursa

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Category
image_load
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-05-11
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects WindowsCodecs.dll being loaded from a location outside the Windows system directories, the DLL search order hijack Fighting Ursa uses when a renamed calc.exe sideloads a malicious copy to run its batch payload. Loading a system DLL name from a user path indicates sideloading rather than legitimate use. Detecting this exposes the sideload stage of the infection.

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Suspicious WindowsCodecs DLL Sideload from Non System Path by Fighting Ursa
Pivot detection · T1574.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.