Suspicious Wininit Look-Alike Binary Execution from Windows Directory

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
- T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects execution of a binary named to closely resemble the legitimate Windows initialization process which Lorenz ransomware uses for persistence from the Windows directory. Observed in NCC Group research unmasking Lorenz ransomware deploying a WinIniw.exe persistence binary. Typosquatting core system process names is a common masquerading tactic that warrants investigation.

Reporting behind it

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Suspicious Wininit Look-Alike Binary Execution from Windows Directory

Pivot detection · T1036.005 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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