Suspicious Winpty Agent Spawned by Net Monitor Employee Monitoring Process

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-30
Updated
2026-09-30

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects winpty-agent.exe being spawned by lsa.exe, the Net Monitor for Employees process, a lineage observed in ransomware operations that abused employee-monitoring software for interactive command execution. The winpty pseudo-terminal helper launched from a monitoring agent provides the actor a hands-on shell channel. This parent-child relationship is anomalous and indicates the monitoring tool is being weaponized for hands-on-keyboard activity.

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Suspicious Winpty Agent Spawned by Net Monitor Employee Monitoring Process
Pivot detection · T1219 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.