Suspicious WinRM Compatibility HTTPS Listener Enabled via winrm.vbs

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-13
Updated
2026-09-13

ATT&CK techniques

Lateral Movement
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects use of winrm.vbs to enable the compatibility HTTPS listener, a remote-service configuration change used by Winnti in Operation CuckooBees to establish encrypted WinRM access. Attackers enable this listener to move laterally and control hosts over an encrypted management channel. Enabling the WinRM compatibility HTTPS listener via the script host is an uncommon and suspicious remote-access setup.

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Suspicious WinRM Compatibility HTTPS Listener Enabled via winrm.vbs
Pivot detection · T1021.006 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.