Suspicious WMI Persistence (via wmi)

This rule detects anomalous WMI event filter and command line event consumer based on WMI and Security Logs.

SigmamediumWindowsv1
sigma
title: Suspicious WMI Persistence (via wmi)
id: f1b96133-6eb9-5c88-85f0-db45f663f456
status: stable
description: This rule detects anomalous WMI event filter and command line event consumer based on WMI and Security Logs.
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/003/
    - https://twitter.com/mattifestation/status/899646620148539397
    - https://www.eideon.com/2018-03-02-THL03-WMIBackdoors/
author: Huntrule Team
date: 2026-03-09
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1546.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: wmi
    definition: 'WMI Namespaces Auditing and SACL should be configured, EventID 5861 and 5859 detection requires Windows 10, 2012 and higher'
detection:
    wmi_filter_to_consumer_binding:
        EventID: 5861
    consumer_keywords:
        - 'ActiveScriptEventConsumer'
        - 'CommandLineEventConsumer'
        - 'CommandLineTemplate'
    wmi_filter_registration:
        EventID: 5859
    filter_scmevent:
        Provider: 'SCM Event Provider'
        Query: 'select * from MSFT_SCMEventLogEvent'
        User: 'S-1-5-32-544'
        PossibleCause: 'Permanent'
    condition: ( (wmi_filter_to_consumer_binding and consumer_keywords) or (wmi_filter_registration) ) and not filter_scmevent
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

Known false positives

  • Unknown

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.