Suspicious WMI Persistence (via wmi)
This rule detects anomalous WMI event filter and command line event consumer based on WMI and Security Logs.
SigmamediumWindowsv1
sigma
suspicious-wmi-persistence-via-wmi
title: Suspicious WMI Persistence (via wmi)
id: f1b96133-6eb9-5c88-85f0-db45f663f456
status: stable
description: This rule detects anomalous WMI event filter and command line event consumer based on WMI and Security Logs.
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/003/
- https://twitter.com/mattifestation/status/899646620148539397
- https://www.eideon.com/2018-03-02-THL03-WMIBackdoors/
author: Huntrule Team
date: 2026-03-09
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1546.003
logsource:
product: windows
service: wmi
definition: 'WMI Namespaces Auditing and SACL should be configured, EventID 5861 and 5859 detection requires Windows 10, 2012 and higher'
detection:
wmi_filter_to_consumer_binding:
EventID: 5861
consumer_keywords:
- 'ActiveScriptEventConsumer'
- 'CommandLineEventConsumer'
- 'CommandLineTemplate'
wmi_filter_registration:
EventID: 5859
filter_scmevent:
Provider: 'SCM Event Provider'
Query: 'select * from MSFT_SCMEventLogEvent'
User: 'S-1-5-32-544'
PossibleCause: 'Permanent'
condition: ( (wmi_filter_to_consumer_binding and consumer_keywords) or (wmi_filter_registration) ) and not filter_scmevent
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
Known false positives
- Unknown
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.