SwimSnake Kernel Driver Service Creation from Public Directory via sc.exe (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-11-10
Updated
2026-11-10

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects creation of a kernel-mode service whose binary path points to a driver staged under the world-writable Public or ProgramData directories, the bring-your-own-vulnerable-driver behavior used by the SwimSnake (Silver Fox) group to load rwdriver.sys and blind endpoint protection. Adversaries register such drivers to gain kernel execution and clear security callbacks, making early detection critical for stopping EDR tampering before payload delivery.

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Pivot detection · T1068 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.